Agents compete to solve a problem. Each agent knows own computational capacity as private information and simultaneously chooses either a risky or a safe problem solving method. This paper analyzes the optimal prize schemes from the perspective of the prize designer who wishes to …nd a solution as quick as possible. It is shown that (i) the winner-take-all scheme can induce excessive risk taking and make problem solving slower (ii) prize schemes with milder competitive pressure induce the optimal risk taking and quicker problem solving.
Introduction
The X-prize foundation, one of leading innovation prize organizers, claims that risk taking is the key factor for quicker breakthroughs and innovation prizes e¤ectively induce the risk taking. On the other hand, when all agents take a risky method and all methods are failed, the risk taking can make innovation slower. This paper analyzes the condition in which a winner-take-all competition makes problem solving slower because of "excessive"risk taking.
Then, it is shown that some prize schemes with milder competitive pressure can induce the optimal risk taking and quicker problem solving. This paper focuses on the speci…c aspect of problem solving: risk taking. The riskiness of problem solving methods is one of the key choice variables in innovation races. For example, in the Human Genome Project, National Institute of Health (NIH) and Celera genomics compete for determining the sequence of chemical based pairs for human DNA.
NIH employed a well known safe method and Celera genomics employed a new method whose e¤ectiveness was unknown. In this paper, there are a safe method and a risky method for problem solving. In the safe method, the agent knows when he …nds out a solution given his computational capacity or budget. Thus, the safe method guarantees the time to get a solution as long as he spends a su¢ cient amount of time. The safe method can be interpreted as an established method in which the time to …nd a solution is approximately known given his ability or budget. On the other hand, in the risky method, the performance depends on his luck and the agent only knows the probability distribution of the time to …nd a solution.
Thus, in the risky method, the agent can …nd a solution very quickly if he is lucky but it can take longer time than the safe method. One interpretation of the risky method is a trial-and-error process with new ideas.
In the …rst part of this paper, I focus on problem solving in a popular prize scheme, winner-take-all competition. The basic setting is introduced in Section 2. The model consists of two agents who face a common problem and only the …rst agent who solves the problem gets a prize. Each agent simultaneously chooses a problem solving method in the beginning of the game. In Section 3, it is shown that the game has a unique symmetric equilibrium which has a cuto¤ property. 1 Section 4 evaluates the equilibrium problem solving from the perspective of the prize designer. The prize designer is impatient and wishes to …nd a solution as early as possible.
Two kinds of prize designers, an expected utility maximizer and a worst case maximizer, are considered. Then, the optimal problem solving is de…ned as a strategy pro…le which induces the optimal risk taking, i.e., the strategy pro…le which maximizes the designer's interest. It is shown that, in the winner-take-all competition, the optimal problem solving cannot be the equilibrium for "di¢ cult" problems because of excessive risk taking.
In Section 5, prize schemes which induce the optimal risk taking are analyzed. A prize scheme is optimal if the optimal problem solving is an equilibrium under the prize scheme.
Two classes of prize schemes are introduced. The …rst is a multi-prize scheme in which prizes are awarded not only to the …rst but also to the second winner. Second is a probabilistic prize scheme in which the prize is determined by the winner-take-all basis with some probability and an absolute performance basis with some probability. The optimal prize scheme is analyzed for each class and it is shown that the key to induce the optimal risk taking is the choice of "right" competitive pressure.
Section 6 extends our analysis to a "costly problem solving" environment where each agent has another task in addition to problem solving and the prize designer has to take into account the participation constraint. Each agent has a safe task which guarantees a small payo¤ but if he focuses on the safe task, it deteriorates the quality of the problem solving. In this setting, since the prize designer cannot observe the choice of the task, there is moral hazard problem. On the other hand, this multi-task environment makes the bene…t of competitive schemes clear. That is, the competitive pressure provides the incentive to focus on problem solving. Then, the question is whether we can provide a reasonable level of competitive pressure which does not induce the excessive risk taking behavior yet still provides incentive to participate the competition. It is shown that when the payo¤ from the safe task is su¢ ciently low and the lack of the e¤ort deteriorates the speed of his problem solving signi…cantly, there is a prize scheme which induces the optimal problem solving. The 2 prize scheme is the same as the optimal prize scheme in the non multi-task environment except for one aspect: there is a deadline for the problem solving in which the agent cannot get any prize from the competition after the deadline.
Related literature. Since agents compete to …nd a solution, this model is related to strategic search models. In most of strategic search models, the intensity of search is a key choice variable, e.g., Fershtman and Rubinstein (1997) , R&D race models such as Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) . However, this paper focuses on the di¤erent aspect "how to solve it." I restrict our attention to the situation where "how hard we think" is much less important than "how to solve." For example, when the budget is already determined, most of scientists try to utilize their time and budget as much as possible. Then, the key choice variable is their approach to solve the problem.
The winner-take-all competition induces an excessive risk taking behavior for some problems in our model. Risk taking in winner-take-all environments is well known, e.g., Tirole (1988), Dekel and Scotchmer (1999) , Hvide (2002) . Unlike their models, risk taking itself is not main interest of our paper. The focus of our paper is "excessive" risk taking and prize schemes which eliminate the excessive risk taking and induce the optimal risk taking. This paper is also related to contest and tournament literature. In most of contest and tournament models, each agent chooses the e¤ort or investment level, e.g., Lazear and Rosen (1981) . On the other hand, in my model, the main interest is in the risk taking in problem solving. There are not many models which take into account risk taking in contest. Hvide (2002), Hvide and Kristiansen (2003) , and Krakel (2008) analyzed risk taking in contest and provide some interesting economic implications, e.g., explanation of the relative performance evaluation puzzle. Unlike their papers, the main interest of our paper is in the design of the prize scheme. Thus, this paper is also related to contest/tournament design literatures, e.g., Taylor (1995) , Sela (2001, 2006) , Che and Gale (2003) . The main di¤erence is that they design contest/tournament to induce the optimal e¤ort or investment level. On the other hand, our prize scheme is designed to induce the optimal risk taking.
2 Basic Model
Basics. Time is continuous and indexed by t 2 [0; 1) = T : There are two agents, i = 1; 2 who compete to solve a problem under a prize scheme. Let t i be the time at which agent i …nds a solution and (t 1 ; t 2 ) be an outcome of problem solving. Let Z = R + be the set of prizes. Then, the prize function for agent i is a mapping b i : T 2 ! (T Z) [ f?g which speci…es the amount of prize z 2 Z and its delivery timing given (t 1 ; t 2 ) where f?g denotes "no prize," i.e., his payo¤ is 0 for all t 2 T : A prize scheme is, then, b = (b 1 (t 1 ; t 2 ); b 2 (t 2 ; t 1 )):
Each agent has the same time preference. Let u i (z; t) be the utility of agent i from prize z at time t: Then, I assume that u i (z; t) = v(z) (t) where v(z) is strictly increasing in z and v(0) = 0: (t) is a time discount function which is continuous, strictly decreasing in t;
lim t!1 (t) = 0 and lim t!0 (t) = 1: In short, agents are impatient and the payo¤ from any size of prize goes to zero as the delivery timing goes to in…nity.
Winner-take-all competition. In the …rst part of this paper, I focus on the winner-take-all prize scheme. Concretely, the winner-take-all prize scheme b(t i ; t j ) is
Obviously, we can de…ne a variation of the winner-take-all prize scheme by changing the prize rule at t i = t j : However, the probability of such outcome is zero and thus it has no e¤ect on the equilibrium analysis.
Problem solving strategy. When …nding a solution is not immediate but time-consuming process, "how to solve it" becomes another decision problem. There are two qualitatively di¤erent approaches to solving problems. One is a safe method and the other is a risky method: Each agent i has private information about his computational capacity i 2 = [ min ; max ] (0; 1) and i is independently drawn from an absolutely continuous distribution function G( ) with supp(g) = : Then, if agent i chooses the safe method; he …nds a solution for sure at t = i 2 but he has no chance to …nd the solution before i :
On the other hand, if agent i chooses the risky method, he does not know how much time he needs to …nd a solution. More concretely, the time at which agent i …nds a solution t i is 4 independently drawn from an absolutely continuous distribution (t) with supp( ) = [0; T ] but t i is not observable for either agent. Notice that the risky method can take time to …nd a solution at most T:
1 I assume that (t) is common knowledge and T > max .
Timing of the game. The game consists of the following two steps. 
for all i 2 i :
Equilibrium analysis
In this section, I show that there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium: First, I introduce a class of strategies which plays an important role in the analysis.
De…nition 1.
A strategy i ( ) is cut o¤ strategy if there is a cut o¤ type^ i 2 such that 8 < :
An equilibrium is cut o¤ equilibrium if it consists of cut o¤ strategies.
In another words, in a cut o¤ strategy, all types which play the safe method have larger capacity than the cuto¤ level. 1 The result of this paper is preserved even if we allow to have T = 1: 2 I focus on pure strategies since the set of types who play a mixed strategy in equilibrium is always measure zero.
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Lemma 1. In every equilibrium, both players use cut o¤ strategies. However, there is no symmetric equilibrium in which^ i =^ j = max .
Proof. See appendix.
Remark 1.
Observe that if the risky method tends to take a long time, type max prefers to play the safe method in individual problem solving. However, type max never plays the safe method in the equilibrium of the winner-take-all competition.
The intuition of lemma 1 is the following. First, there is no equilibrium where all agents plays the safe method for all : This is because, if all agents play the safe method, type max knows that he has no chance to solve the problem earlier than the other agent and his payo¤ is zero for sure. Secondly, whenever an agent plays the safe method in equilibrium, his strategy is a cut o¤ strategy. The idea is simple. If type 0 …nds that there is no pro…table deviation from the safe method; then any < 0 …nds the safe method more pro…table than the risky method.
Proposition 1.
There exists a unique symmetric equilibrium.
The idea of Proposition 1 is the following. First, since the expected payo¤ of agent i from the safe method is decreasing in i and the expected payo¤ from the risky method is independent of i ; whenever there exists a common cut o¤ type for each player who is indi¤erent between the safe method and the risky method, the common cuto¤ type is an equilibrium cuto¤. Second, we can show that if there exists one cut o¤ type which satis…es the indi¤erence condition for each player, there is no other cut o¤ type which also does so.
Roughly speaking, this is because the di¤erence between the expected payo¤ to the risky method and that to the safe method for the cut o¤ type becomes higher if the cut o¤ level is higher. Hence, if there are two equilibrium cut o¤ types and the indi¤erence condition is satis…ed for the lower cut o¤ type, the condition cannot be satis…ed for the larger cut o¤ type.
Proof. By Lemma 1, every equilibrium is a cut o¤ equilibrium. Hence, all I need to do is the following two steps. First, I establish the existence of a symmetric cut o¤ equilibrium.
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Second, I show that such symmetric cut o¤ type is unique. Before proving the results, I
introduce the following notation.
The expected payo¤ of agent i of type i when agent i plays the safe method and agent j plays the risky method:
The expected payo¤ of agent i given his opponent's type is j when agent i plays the risky method and agent j plays the safe method:
The expected payo¤ of agent i when both agents play the risky method:
The expected payo¤ of agent i given type pro…le ( i ; j ) when both agent i and j play the safe method:
Step 1. The construction of the equilibrium cuto¤.
Suppose both agents follows the same cut o¤ strategy and let^ be the symmetric cut o¤ type. Then, the expected payo¤ of agent i of type^ from the risky method is
The expected payo¤ of agent i of type^ from the safe method is
Then, let z(^ ) be the di¤erence between the expected payo¤ to the risky method and that to the safe method for cut o¤ type^ ; that is, Notice that V i;RR V i;SR ( i ) has the smallest value when i = min : Thus, if V i;RR < V i;SR ( i ) for some ; then z( min ) < 0: On the other hand,
Since V i;SR (^ ) is continuous in^ ; z(^ ) is also continuous. Hence, there exists at least onê 2 int( ) such that z(^ ) = 0: I claim that a symmetric cut o¤ strategy pro…le with^ constitutes an equilibrium. To verify the claim, suppose each agent plays the safe method for 2 [ min ;^ ) and plays the risky method for 2 (^ ; max ]. Since V i;SR ( i ) is decreasing in i ; by construction, for any i >^ ;
Step 2. There exists unique equilibrium cuto¤^ .
Recall that^ is chosen so that
if such^ exists and^ = min otherwise. Thus, I need to show that z(^ ) = 0 has unique solution whenever it exists. Notice that
On the other hand, whenever there exists a cut o¤ equilibrium with^ 6 = min , V i;RR V i;SR ( min ) < 0:
Remark 2. If a problem is su¢ ciently "di¢ cult" for the risky method in the sense that
T is large and (T =2) is small, there is no asymmetric equilibrium and thus the symmetric cut o¤ is the unique equilibrium.
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The following is the intuition. Suppose we have an asymmetric equilibrium. Then, the agent with the lower cut o¤ type has a extra chance to have larger capacity than the other agent when both play the safe method. Hence, the agent with the lower cut o¤ type has a higher expected payo¤ from the safe method and this is not a¤ected by (t). On the other hand, if (t) is su¢ ciently small for a su¢ ciently large set of t's, the expected payo¤ from the risky method is small and the di¤erence of expected payo¤s from the risky method is small between agents. As a result, under asymmetric cut o¤s, we cannot make the expected payo¤s from the safe method and the risky method indi¤erent for both cut o¤ types. Moreover, if a problem is su¢ ciently easy in the sense that ( min ) is large, there is no asymmetric equilibrium. The reason is simple. The risky method is the dominant strategy if ( min ) is large.
Before moving to the next section, I compare competitive problem solving with individual problem solving. Given type i ; agent i plays the safe method (the risky method) in individual problem solving if and only if
Then, let Ind be the cut o¤ type which characterizes the individual decision rule. That is,
Ind ; the optimal choice is the risky (safe) method. First, it is easy to see that if ( min ) is large, all agents play the risky method in both competitive problem solving and individual problem solving, i.e., min =^ = Ind : Second, if ( max ) is small, then all types play the safe method in individual problem solving, i.e., Ind = max . On the other hand, by
The important point is that the meaning of "capacity" depends on whether there is a competitor or not. The agent takes into account his capacity relative to the opponent to choose the problem solving strategy when there is a competitor. On the other hand, in individual problem solving, relative capacity is meaningless. That is, even if the agent has max ; he plays the safe method as long as the expected time to …nd a solution is shorter than that in the risky method. Thus, if a problem is su¢ ciently "di¢ cult", all types play the safe method in individual problem solving.
4 Optimal problem solving
In this section, I de…ne optimal problem solving from the perspective of the prize designer.
Suppose the prize designer's interest is in obtaining a solution as early as possible. Formally, let t i be the time at which agent i …nds a solution and let t = minft 1 ; t 2 g: By obtaining a solution of the problem, the prize designer gets pro…t B > 0 at t : The payo¤ of the prize designer from B at t is e u(B; t ) = e v(B) (t ) where e v(B) > 0: I assume that the prize designer shares the same time discount function (t ) with agents. Let be the probability distribution of t induced by a problem solving pro…le. Then, W ( ) denotes the utility of the prize designer from : I assume that the total budget of the prize is x > 0 and spending less than the budget does not improve the prize designer's payo¤. Hence, the objective function of the prize designer is W ( ):
Now, consider a pair of mapping (y 1 ( 1 ; 2 ); y 2 ( 1 ; 2 )) where y i : 2 ! fS; Rg: Then, let
given any ( 1 ; 2 ): In short, this is the pair of problem solving methods the prize designer prefers to assign when the type pro…le is observable.
Since the type is private information in this model, I also introduce a criterion which takes into account the informational constraint. Let 1 ( 1 ); 2 ( 2 ) be the distribution of t given strategy pro…le ( 1 ( 1 ); 2 ( 2 )): I de…ne optimal problem solving (OPS) as a strategy
In this paper, I consider two kinds speci…cations of W ( ) depending on how the prize designer aggregates the utility index e u(B; t ) across t : First, the prize designer is an expected utility maximizer if his objective function is the following.
Second, it is often the case that the main concern of the prize designer is to …nd out a solution before the deadline 3 . In this case, the prize designer's concern may be how much time might be needed in the worst case to …nd out a solution. The prize designer is a worst case maximizer if his objective function is the following.
Now, I turn to the analysis of the equilibrium problem solving in the winner-take-all scheme. For the …rst part of the analysis, I focus on the case where the prize designer is the expected utility maximizer. I start from the analysis of "di¢ cult" problems:
Suppose the prize designer is the expected utility maximizer.
(i) If T is large and (T =2) is su¢ ciently small, then the OPSA is y i ( i ; j ) = R and
(ii) If T is large and (T =2) is su¢ ciently small, the OPS consists of a symmetric cut o¤ strategy pro…le.
Since all equilibria are cuto¤ equilibrium, the winner-take-all game induces the OPSA for su¢ ciently "di¢ cult" problems only if i <^ < j given equilibrium cuto¤^ : Otherwise, the equilibrium problem solving is not the OPSA.
On the other hand, the following proposition states that the winner-take-all game induces the excessive risk taking and cannot induce the OPS for "di¢ cult" problems.
Proposition 2. Suppose the prize designer is the expected utility maximizer. If T is large and (T =2) is su¢ ciently small, then the symmetric equilibrium cut o¤ type is smaller than the cut o¤ type in the OPS.
Let^ OP S be the cuto¤ type for the OPS. Proposition 2 says that if a problem is su¢ ciently "di¢ cult" for the risky method, competition forces the agent with moderate capacity, i.e., 3 In computer science, average-case and worst-case performance are popular criteria to evaluate algorithms.
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2 (^ ;^ OP S ); to employ the risky method, i.e., excessive risk taking. The intuition is the following. In the winner-take-all game, when an agent plays the safe method, the expected payo¤ depends on the type of the agent. On the other hand, when he employs the risky method; the expected payo¤ is independent of his type. Thus, when an agent plays the safe method in equilibrium, his capacity has to be large enough to win the game with a reasonably high probability. As a result, an agent with moderate capacity employs the risky method in equilibrium. On the other hand, notice that if both agents play the risky method, the time to …nd a solution can be long. Then, to reduce the chance of having such situation, the agent with moderate capacity is assigned to the safe method in the OPS. Now, I turn to the analysis for "easy" problems, i.e., ( min ) is high.
Observation 2. Suppose the prize designer is the expected utility maximizer. If ( min )
is su¢ ciently large, both agents play the risky method in both the OPSA and the OPS.
Proof. The expected utility of the prize designer in which both agents employ the risky method is at least
On the other hand, if an agent with higher capacity plays the safe method and the other employs the risky method, the expected utility for the prize designer is at most
Hence, the expected utility of the prize designer in which both agents play the risky method is higher if
:
The following proposition shows that the equilibrium can be the OPSA and the OPS for su¢ ciently "easy" problems.
Proposition 3. Suppose the prize designer is the expected utility maximizer. If ( min )
is su¢ ciently large, the symmetric equilibrium is the OPSA.
Proof. Immediate from Observation 2 and the fact the symmetric equilibrium cuto¤ type is min for large ( min ): Q.E.D. Now, I turn to the analysis in which the prize designer is the worst case maximizer.
Observation 3. Suppose the prize designer is the worst case maximizer.
(i) i j , then (y 1 ( 1 ; 2 ); y 2 ( 1 ; 2 )) is the OPSA whenever y j ( i ; j ) = S: (ii) The OPS consists of a set of strategy pro…les such that there exists agent i who plays the safe method for any i .
Note that the OPSA and the OPS do not depend on the "di¢ culty" of the problem. For the OPSA, since the prize designer knows that the worst case of the safe method is better than that of the risky method, he can maximize his payo¤ by assigning the safe method to the agent with larger capacity. For the OPS, observe that whenever each of agent has a set of types in which he plays the risky method, the prize designer's payo¤ is e u(B; T ): On the other hand, when one of agents employ the safe method independent of his type, the prize designer's payo¤ is e u(B; max ) > e u(B; T ):
The next proposition says when the prize designer is the worst case maximizer, he can be better o¤ by asking one agent to solve the problem without competition.
Proposition 4. Suppose the prize designer is the worst case maximizer. The symmetric equilibrium cannot be the OPS for any problem. Moreover, if T is large and (T =2) is su¢ ciently small, then the prize designer gets higher payo¤ by asking one agent to solve the problem rather than setting 2-person winner-take-all competition.
Proof. The …rst part is immediate from Lemma 1, and observation 3. For the second part, consider individual problem solving with large T and small (T =2): Then, the optimal problem solving in the individual decision problem is to choose the safe method for all types.
Note that the prize designer's payo¤ is at least e u(B; max ) if he asks one agent to solve the problem. On the other hand, by Lemma1, the prize designer's payo¤ from the winner-take-all competition setting is always e u(B; T ): Q.E.D.
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Optimal prize scheme
When a problem is "di¢ cult" for the risky method, the winner-take-all competition does not induce the OPS. This section introduces prize schemes which induce the OPS in an equilibrium. Recall that, for "di¢ cult" problems, the competitive pressure induces the excessive risk taking in the equilibrium. Hence, the key to induce the OPS is reduce the competitive pressure of the winner-take-all scheme. I provide two kinds of such prize schemes. The …rst is a multi-prize scheme. In this prize scheme, unlike the winner-take-all game, not only the winner but also the loser gets some reward. The second is a probabilistic prize scheme in which both agents do not know the exact prize structure when they choose the problem solving method. The prize structure is drawn from a set of prize structures and the distribution is known to both agents.
If the focus of the analysis is "costless problem solving," i.e., participating problem solving is not costly, there is a noncompetitive scheme which can induce the OPS. A reward scheme is cooperative if both agents share prize x when the …rst agent …nds a solution.
Observation 4. Suppose the prize designer is the expected utility maximizer. The OPS is an equilibrium under the cooperative scheme.
A drawback of the cooperative scheme is that the implementation of the OPS relies on the "costless problem solving" setting. When it is costly to participate problem solving, e.g., there is an outside option, the cooperative scheme faces free rider problem. Then, this section focuses on competitive schemes so that we can extend the analysis for a "costly problem solving" environment in the later section. Now, I introduce the key concept of this section.
De…nition 2. An optimal prize scheme is a prize scheme which induces the OPS in an equilibrium.
That is, in the optimal prize scheme, the strategy pro…le which maximizes the prize designer's interest can be supported as an equilibrium. In this section, without loss of generality, I focus on the class of prize schemes in which the total amount of prizes is no more than x > 0:
Multi-prize scheme
In the winner-take-all competition, only the winner receives a prize. Multi-prize scheme is a prize scheme in which the loser also receives a prize. Concretely, the prize designer gives 2 [0; x] to the loser and x to the winner at the time the agent …nds a solution. Formally, the multi-prize scheme is (b 1 (t 1 ; t 2 j ); b 2 (t 2 ; t 1 j )) where
Notice that since the agent can be rewarded even if he does not win the game, the competitive pressure of this game is lower than that of the winner-take-all game. Now, the question is whether we can …nd the second prize level which makes the prize scheme optimal.
The following proposition says that, for su¢ ciently "di¢ cult" problems, there exists an optimal multi-prize scheme.
Proposition 5.
(i) Suppose the prize designer is the expected utility maximizer. If T is su¢ ciently large and (T =2) is su¢ ciently small, then there exists 2 (0; x=2) such that b(t 1 ; t 2 j ) is the optimal prize scheme.
(ii) Suppose the prize designer is the worst case maximizer. If T is su¢ ciently large and (T =2) is su¢ ciently small, then b(t 1 ; t 2 j ) is the optimal prize scheme whenever is su¢ ciently close to x=2.
To provide an intuition, recall that, for both criteria, the optimal prize scheme has to eliminate the excessive risk taking behavior for "di¢ cult" problems. Observe that when the loser can get a prize based on the time he …nds a solution, the risk taking is not attractive choice whenever (i) the chance of being the loser is high and (ii) the problem is "di¢ cult."
Thus, when the loser can get a prize, it reduces the bene…t from the risk taking for larger capacity types. Then, when the prize designer provides a right amount of prize to the loser, the prize scheme can eliminate excessive risk taking and maximize the prize designer's expected payo¤.
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Proof. Given ; the expected payo¤ of the cuto¤ type from the risky method iŝ
Given ; the expected payo¤ of the cuto¤ type from the safe method iŝ
Now, observe thatÛ
Moreover, recall that, when the game is the winner-take-all game, the expected payo¤ from each action is
Suppose the prize designer is the expected utility maximizer. Recall that, when the problem has su¢ ciently large T and su¢ ciently small (T =2); we have z(^ OP S ) > 0: Moreover, it is easy to see that z multi (^ OP S jx=2) < 0 if the problem has su¢ ciently large T and su¢ ciently small (T =2): Then, since z multi (^ OP S j ) is continuous in ; there always exists 2 (0; x=2) such that z multi (^ OP S j ) = 0:
Suppose the prize designer is the worst case maximizer. If T is su¢ ciently large and (T =2) is su¢ ciently small, at least one of agents play the safe method in the OPS. Obviously, if T is su¢ ciently large and (T =2) is su¢ ciently small, we have z multi (^ jx=2) < 0 for all : Then, given large T and su¢ ciently small (T =2); if is su¢ ciently close to x=2; then, by continuity, z multi (^ j ) < 0 for all^ : Then, all agents choose the safe method in the equilibrium. This is the OPS. Q.E.D.
Probabilistic prize scheme
Suppose the prize structure is not known among agents when each agent chooses a problem solving method. Concretely, suppose there are two possible prize structures, i.e., the winnertake-all and an absolute performance basis prize. In the winner-take-all competition, the agent is rewarded only if he …nds a solution earlier than the other, i.e., being winner. The absolute performance basis prize means that the reward is based only on the time the agent …nds a solution. Then, a probabilistic prize scheme is characterized by the probability that the prize structure is the winner-take-all competition. Concretely, the probabilistic prize scheme b(t 1 ; t 2 jq) is as follows.
b i;wta (t i ; t j ) with probability q b i;abs (t i ; t j ) with probability 1 q where b i;wta (t i ; t j ) = 8 < :
x at t i if t i < t j ? if t i t j and b i;abs (t i ; t j ) = x=2 at t i :
Notice that since the agent faces no competition with probability 1 q, the competitive pressure of this game is lower than that of the winner-take-all game.
The time line of the game is as follows.
Step 1. The prize designer chooses q which is observable for agents. Then, based on q;
one of prize structures is chosen by the prize designer but this is not observable for agents.
Step 2. Given q; each agent chooses his problem solving strategy. When the agent …nds a solution, he receives the prize based on the prize structure.
The next proposition shows that, for each criterion, there exists probability q which induces the OPS in an equilibrium.
Proposition 6.
(i) Suppose the prize designer is the expected utility maximizer. If T is su¢ ciently large and (T =2) is su¢ ciently small, there exists a unique q 2 (0; 1) in which b(t 1 ; t 2 jq ) is the optimal prize scheme.
(ii) Suppose the prize designer is the worst case maximizer. If T is su¢ ciently large and (T =2) is su¢ ciently small, b(t 1 ; t 2 jq) is the optimal prize scheme for su¢ ciently small q.
The reason that this scheme eliminates the risk taking behavior is similar to that of the multi-prize scheme. When agents face the absolute performance basis prize structure with some probability, the incentive of risk taking is lower for "di¢ cult" problems. Then, we can always …nd a probability which eliminates the excessive risk taking.
Proof. Given q; the expected payo¤ of^ from the risky method is
On the other hand, given q; the expected payo¤ of^ from the safe method is
Recall that z(^ ) is the di¤erence of expected payo¤s between the risky method and the safe method in the winner-take-all scheme. Then, let z rand (^ jq) be the di¤erence of expected payo¤s between the risky method and the safe method in which the type^ faces the winnertake-all game with probability q: That is,
18 Now, suppose the prize designer is the expected utility maximizer. To show that there exists q which induces the OPS, recall that, if T is su¢ ciently large and (T =2) is su¢ ciently small,
Then, since z rand ( OP S jq) is continuous and strictly increasing in q; we always …nd a unique q 2 (0; 1) such that z( OP S jq ) = 0:
Suppose the prize designer is the worst case maximizer, observe that z rand (^ j0) < 0 for all^ if T is su¢ ciently large and (T =2) is su¢ ciently small. Then, by continuity, whenever q is su¢ ciently close to 0, z rand (^ jq) < 0 for all^ : Then, the symmetric equilibrium is the
OPS. Q.E.D.
Remark 3. The multi-prize scheme and the probabilistic prize scheme are similar in the sense that it reduces the competitive pressure to induce the OPS. However, one clear merit of the probabilistic prize scheme over the multi-prize scheme is the following. Consider the case where there are I agents. Moreover, suppose the OPS is characterized by a symmetric cuto¤ type. Then, it is easy to …nd the optimal probabilistic prize scheme since all we need to …nd is the probability q: On the other hand, it is more di¢ cult to …nd the optimal multi-prize structure for I prizes.
A multi-task environment and participation constraint
When agents have another task in addition to problem solving, the agent has to decide which task he focuses on, i.e., a costly problem solving. Then, one natural question is whether the optimal prize scheme in the last section still induces the OPS in a multi-task environment.
To investigate the question, suppose there is a safe task in which the agent gets v > 0 for sure whenever the agent focuses on the safe task. Then, the agent has to choose whether he focuses on problem solving or not. Concretely, we add a new action "focusing on the safe task," denoted by N; to the set of feasible actions. Hence, a strategy of agent i is I assume that the prize designer gets no bene…t from the safe task and his objective function is the same as that of the basic setting. An important assumption here is that the prize designer of the competition cannot observe whether the agent focuses on problem solving or not, that is, the choice of "which to focus" is a hidden action. Thus, the prize structure cannot be conditional on the hidden action.
When we take into account the choice of "which to focus," the bene…t of competition becomes clear. The following observation clari…es the bene…t of competitive schemes in the multi-task environment.
Observation 5.
(i) If u(x; 0) u(x; T N ) is su¢ ciently small, then the optimal decision in the individual problem solving is N for all :
(ii) If u(x; 0) u(x; T N ) is su¢ ciently small, then there is no equilibrium where both agents focus on problem solving in the cooperative scheme (Free rider problem).
(iii) In the winner-take-all competition, both agents focus on problem solving in an equilibrium if v is su¢ ciently small given x.
To see Observation 5 (i), in the individual problem, the expected payo¤ from focusing on problem solving is at most
Observe that, given " > 0; we can always …nd small u(x; 0) u(x; T N ) such that u(x; 0) max
Hence, if u(x; 0) u(x; T N ) is su¢ ciently small,
20 Thus, the agent prefers to choose N: We can explain Observation 5 (ii) with a similar argument.
To understand Observation 5 (iii), suppose the prize is given by the winner-take-all fashion and both agents focus on problem solving. Then, if the agent deviates and focuses on the safe task, he never wins the competition and his payo¤ is only v: Hence, if v is su¢ ciently small, there is no incentive to deviate.
The winner-take-all scheme can provide the incentive to participate problem solving but it also induces the excessive risk taking behavior. Then, our question is whether optimal prize schemes in the last section can provide the incentive to participate problem solving. Let b mlt be the optimal multi-prize scheme in the single task environment and b rnd be the optimal probabilistic prize scheme in the single task environment: The next observation says that, for "di¢ cult" problems, optimal incentive schemes in the single task environment cannot induce the OPS when agents are su¢ ciently patient.
Observation 6. Suppose T is large and (T =2) is su¢ ciently small so that the OPS is characterized by symmetric cuto¤^ OP S : Then, if u(x; 0) u(x; T N ) is su¢ ciently small, type max always has incentive to deviate from the OPS under b mlt and b rnd :
Observation 6 says that the optimal prize schemes in the last section do not satisfy the "participation condition" when agents are su¢ ciently patient. To see the claim, recall that prize scheme b mlt rewards the loser. When the agent is max and the problem is "di¢ cult", the probability that he loses the competition is very low. Then, since the safe task guarantees the payo¤ v; there is no reason to make an e¤ort to get the second prize with cost v as long as he is su¢ ciently patient. The analogous argument can be applied to the case of the probabilistic prize scheme. Now, in order to provide the incentive of focusing on problem solving, I introduce the following class of prize scheme.
De…nition 3. Given prize scheme b = (b 1 (t 1 ; t 2 ); b 2 (t 2 ; t 1 )); a prize scheme with deadline
In short, whenever agent i …nds a solution after deadline T; the expected payo¤ from "not focusing on problem" for agent i is only v > 0: Let b opt be an optimal prize scheme when v = 0: The next proposition claims that if (i) the payo¤ from the safe task is small and (ii) the lack of focus makes problem solving su¢ ciently slower, the prize scheme with deadline b D opt induces the OPS in an equilibrium. To get an intuition, suppose one agent deviates from the OPS. Then, he gets payo¤ v for sure and may get the prize from the competition if he can solve the problem before the deadline. However, if N (T ) is smaller, the probability that the agent gets the prize becomes lower because of the deadline. Hence, whenever both N (T ) and v are su¢ ciently low, there is no incentive to deviate from the OPS.
The prize scheme with deadline does not work well if the lack of the focus does not deteriorate his performance of problem solving very much. Consider the case that N (T ) is large. Then, the expected payo¤ from N can be high under deadline T: Then, the di¤erence between the expected payo¤ from N and that from the risky method can be small. As a 22 result, when v is su¢ ciently large, the prize scheme with deadline cannot induce the OPS.
Remark 4. Given a prize scheme, v x is increasing in the level of prize x: Thus, given v > 0; we can always …nd large x which makes v x > v:
Discussion
This paper shows that the key to induce the optimal risk taking is the choice of competitive pressure. For instance, it is shown that the second prize can eliminate the excessive risk taking. The second prize is observed in innovation prizes in the real world. For example, the Google Lunar X PRIZE has $5 million second prize ($20 million for the …rst prize). 4 The X-prize foundation claims innovation prizes are the e¤ective incentive to induce risk taking which brings breakthroughs. Thus, if their aim is to encourage the optimal risk taking, their second prize is consistent with the implication of this paper.
On the other hand, it is important to notice that "optimal risk taking" in this paper depends on the setting where there is a safe method. For some cases, e.g., sequencing DNA, this is a reasonable assumption. However, if there is no promising/ safe approach for a problem, the excessive risk taking is not well de…ned and the rationale of the second prize is not clear. This paper implies that whether the problem has relatively "safe" approach or not can be a key factor for the design of the optimal prize scheme.
Summary
In the …rst part of this paper, I analyzed the situation where agents compete to solve a problem in a winner-take-all fashion. Each agent chooses either a risky or a safe method.
The winner-take-all competition induces the problem solving which maximizes the prize designer's objective when the problem is "easy" for the risky method. However, the winner-take-all competition induces the excessive risk taking behavior when a problem is "di¢ cult" for the risky method.
In the second part of this paper, I introduced prize schemes which induce the optimal risk taking in an equilibrium for those "di¢ cult" problems. The following classes of prize 4 http://www.googlelunarxprize.org/lunar/about-the-prize/rules-and-guidelines 23 schemes can induce the optimal problem solving.
Multi-prize scheme: In this scheme, the designer gives a prize not only to the winner but also loser. The prize designer chooses the …rst and second prizes.
Probabilistic prize scheme: In this scheme, the prize structure is determined by a lottery. One of prize structures is the winner-take-all and the other is an absolute performance basis prize. Each agent does not know the prize structure when he chooses his problem solving method but the probability of the prize structure is common knowledge among agents. The prize designer chooses the probability of each prize structure.
In the extension, I investigated a multi-task environment. Each agent has another "safe" task and chooses whether he focuses on problem solving or not.
Optimal prize schemes in the basic setting cannot provide the incentive to focus on problem solving when agents are su¢ ciently patient: Moral hazard problem.
To resolve the problem, I introduced a deadline to the prize schemes. That is, the agent gets a prize from competition only if he …nds a solution before the deadline. Then, I found the following.
The competition with deadline can provide the incentive to focus on problem solving and induces the optimal problem solving if the lack of focus deteriorates the performance of problem solving signi…cantly and the payo¤ from the safe task is su¢ ciently small. C1 :
On the other hand, the equilibrium expected payo¤ for
Then, for 00 i 2 S i ; the expected payo¤ from deviation is Z
which is independent of i :
are both strictly decreasing in i ; this deviation is always pro…table as long as C1 holds. A contradiction. Q.E.D.
Proof of Remark 2
Claim. There is no asymmetric equilibrium if T is large and (T =2) is su¢ ciently small.
Proof. Suppose there exists an equilibrium which consists of cut o¤ strategies with a pair of cut o¤ (^ i ;^ j ) such that^ i >^ j : Then, the expected payo¤s of agent i and j from 25 the risky method are
The expected payo¤s of agent i and j from the safe method are
Notice that, in equilibrium, we need to have U iR = U iS (^ i j^ j ) and U jR = U jS (^ j j^ i ): I will show that this is not possible if T is large and (T =2) is su¢ ciently small. Let^ be the cut o¤ type in a symmetric cut o¤ equilibrium:
On the other hand, if the cut o¤ type of agent j is^ j ; U jR stays in the same level but
Case 2.^ i ;^ j >^ :
On the other hand, if the cut o¤ type of agent i is^ i >^ 0 i ; U iR stays in the same level but
j and the probability that agent j wins for sure becomes higher. Moreover,
On the other hand, jU jR (^ i ) U jR (^ 0 i )j can be arbitrarily small by choosing large T and small (T =2): Thus, U jR (^ i ) < U jS (^ j j^ i ): Q.E.D.
Proof of Observation 1
Proof of (i). Immediate.
Proof of (ii). First, I show that the OPS is always cuto¤ strategy pro…le. Let i ( i ) and j ( j ) be the OPS. Then, for each i ; a problem solving method i ( i ) maximizes the expected utility of the prize designer given j ( j ): Now, suppose i ( Moreover, let W i;a i ;a j ( i ; j ) be the expected payo¤ of the prize designer given (a i ; a j ) and ( i ; j ): Then, whenever the strategy pro…le is the OPS, given
The expected payo¤ of the prize designer, given
It is easy to see that, given j ; W i;SR (
On the other hand, note that Z
A contradiction.
Second, I show that if T is large and (T =2) is su¢ ciently small, the OPS is a symmetric cut o¤ strategy. Given^ j ; the expected payo¤s for the prize designer in which agent i plays the risky method is
Note that W iR (^ i j^ j ) is constant in^ i : On the other hand, given^ j and^ i ; the expected payo¤ for the prize designer in which agent i plays the safe method is
Note that, by choosing large T and small (T =2); we can make
First, I claim that, if T is large and (T =2) is su¢ ciently small,^ i (^ j ) is non increasing in^ j : To see the claim, observe that
T is large and (T =2) is su¢ ciently small,^ i (^ j ) is non increasing in^ j : Second, I claim that if T is large and (T =2) is su¢ ciently small,^ i ( min ) = max : To see the claim, note that f
Third, I claim that if T is large and (T =2) is su¢ ciently small^ i ( max ) < max : To see the claim, note that f W iR ( max j max ) = R j e u(B; j )dG( j ) = f W iS ( max j max ) = R j e u(B;^ i )dG( j ):
Note that f W iR ( max j max ) < W iR ( max j max ) and f W iS ( max j max ) = W iS ( max j max ): Hence, if T is large and (T =2) is su¢ ciently small, W iR ( max j max ) > W iS ( max j max ) and thuŝ i ( max ) 6 = max : Finally, observe that^ i (^ j ) is continuous in^ j and, by symmetry we know^ j (^ i ) has the same property as^ i (^ j ). Then, the above three claims imply that if T is large and 28 (T =2) is su¢ ciently small, there exists unique^ i ;^ j < max such that^ i (^ j (^ i )) =^ i ; j (^ i (^ j )) =^ j : By symmetry,^ i =^ j =^ OP S : Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2
Suppose both agents follow the same cut o¤ strategy and let^ be the symmetric cut o¤ type.
Then, the expected payo¤s of the prize designer given a i = R is
The expected payo¤s of the prize designer given a i = S is First, I show that whenever there exists^ such that e z(^ ) = 0; it has to be unique and =^ OP S . Observe that, if j <^ ; W i;SS (^ ; j ) is the same as the expected payo¤ of the prize designer in which only agent j solves the problem with the safe method. Thus, for any j <^ ; W i;RS ( j ) W i;SS (^ ; j ) > 0:
Then, e z( max ) = W i;RS ( j ) W i;SS ( max ; j ) > 0:
Since W i;SR (^ ) is decreasing in^ ; W iRR W i;SR (^ ) is increasing in^ : Hence, whenever there exists^ such that e z(^ ) = 0; e z( min ) = W i;RR W i;SR ( min ) < 0:
Then, it is easy to see that, for small^ such that W i;RR < W i;SR (^ ); e z(^ ) is increasing in : On the other hand, once^ becomes large enough so that W i;RR > W i;SR (^ ); then e z(^ ) > 0 29 for larger^ : Therefore, whenever there exists^ such that e z(^ ) = 0; it has to be unique.
Then, by observation 1-(ii), we know that^ =^ OP S :
Now, let^ be the equilibrium cuto¤ type. I show that if T is large and (T =2) is su¢ ciently small, then^ <^ OP S . The proof consists of 4 steps. To see the claim, let (t i ja i a j ; i) be the probability that agent i …nds a solution at t i conditional on his winning and action pro…le (a i ; a j ): Then, V i;RS ( j ) W i;SS (^ ; j ) < 0 for any j <^ :
Step 2. By choosing large T and small (T =2); we can make 1 G(^ ) arbitrarily close to 0.
To see the claim, let z(^ ; ) be z(^ ) given : Suppose z(^ ; ) = k: Observe that, by choosing large T and small (T =2); we can make V i;RR and V i;RS ( j ) arbitrarily close to 0.
Hence, by choosing 0 with larger T and small (T =2); we have z(^ ; 0 ) < k: Thus, given any < max ; by choosing large T and small (T =2); we can make z( ; ) < 0: Then, since z(^ ; ) > 0 for su¢ ciently large^ , by choosing large T and small (T =2); we can make^ arbitrarily close to max and G(^ ) arbitrarily close to 1.
Step 3. If T is large and (T =2) is su¢ ciently small, e z(^ ) < 0: V i;RS ( j ) W i;SS (^ ; j ) < 0 for large T and small (T =2): On the other hand, step 2 says that, by choosing large T and small (T =2); we can make 1 G(^ ) arbitrarily close to 0. Hence, e z(^ ) < 0 for large T and small (T =2):
Step 4.^ OP S >^ if T is large and (T =2) is su¢ ciently small.
To see the claim, recall that e z(^ ) = 0 has unique solution^ OP S and e z(^ ) > 0 for >^ OP S and e z(^ ) < 0 for <^ OP S : Therefore, if e z(^ ) < 0; then^ OP S >^ : Q.E.D.
